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In many industries, the importance of software components provided by third-party suppliers
is steadily increasing. As the suppliers seek to secure their intellectual property (IP) rights,
the customer usually has no direct access to the suppliers’ source code, and is able to enforce
the use of verification tools only by legal requirements. In turn, the supplier has no means to
convince the customer about successful verification without revealing the source code. This paper
presents an approach to resolve the conflict between the IP interests of the supplier and the
quality interests of the customer. We introduce a protocol in which a dedicated server (called the
“amanat”) is controlled by both parties: the customer controls the verification task performed
by the amanat, while the supplier controls the communication channels of the amanat to ensure
that the amanat does not leak information about the source code. We argue that the protocol
is both practically useful and mathematically sound. As the protocol is based on well-known
(and relatively lightweight) cryptographic primitives, it allows a straightforward implementation
on top of existing verification tool chains. To substantiate our security claims, we establish the
correctness of the protocol by cryptographic reduction proofs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In classical verification scenarios, the software author and the verification engineer share
a common interest in verifying a piece of software; the author provides the source code
to be analyzed, whereupon the verification engineer communicates the verification verdict.
Both parties are mutually trusted, i.e., the verification engineer trusts that she has verified
production code, and the author trusts that the verification engineer will not use the source
code for unintended purposes.
Industrial production of software-intensive technology however often employs supply
chains which render this simple scenario obsolete. Complex products are being increas-
ingly assembled from multiple components whose development is outsourced to supplying
companies. Typical examples of outsourced software components comprise embedded
controller software [Heinecke 2004; Broy 2006] and Windows device drivers [Ball et al.
2004]. Although the suppliers may use verification techniques for internal use, they are
usually not willing to reveal their source code, as the intellectual property (IP) contained
in the source code is a major asset.
This setting constitutes a principal conflict between the supplier Sup who owns the
source code, and the customer Cus who purchases o n l y the executable. While both
parties share a basic interest in producing high quality software, it is in the customer’s in-
terest to have the source code inspected, and in the supplier’s interest to protect the source
code. More formally, this amounts to the following basic requirements:
(a) Conformance. The customer must be able to validate that the purchased executable
was compiled from successfully verified source code.
(b) Secrecy. The supplier must be able to ensure that no information about the source code
besides the verification result is revealed to the customer.
The main technical contribution of this paper is a new cryptographic verification proto-
col tailored for IP-aware verification. Our protocol is based on standard cryptographic
primitives, and satisfies both requirements with little overhead in the system configura-
tion. Notably, the proposed scheme applies not only to automated verification in a model
checking style, but also supports a wide range of validation techniques, both automated
and semi-manual.
Our solution centers around the notion of an amanat. This terminology is derived from
the historic judicial notion of amanats, i.e., noble prisoners who were kept hostage as
part of a contract. Intuitively, our protocol applies a similar principle: The amanat is a
trusted expert of the customer who settles down in the production plant of the supplier and
executes whatever verification job the customer has entrusted on him. The supplier accepts
this procedure because (i) all of the amanat’s communications are subject to the censorship
of the supplier, and, (ii) the amanat will never leave the supplier again.
It is evident that clauses (i) and (ii) make it quite infeasible to find human amanats;
instead, our protocol utilizes a dedicated server Ama for this task. The protocol guarantees
that Ama is simultaneously controlled by both parties: Cus controls the verification task
performed by Ama, while Sup controls the communication channels of Ama. To convince
Cus about conformance, Ama produces a cryptographic certificate which proves that the
purchased executable has been derived by the amanat from the same source code as the
verification verdict.
To achieve this goal, we employ public key cryptography; the amanat uses the secret pri-
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Fig. 1. A High-Level View of the Amanat Protocol
vate key of the customer, and signs outgoing information with this secret key such that no
additional information can be hidden in the signature. This enables the supplier to inspect
(and possibly block) all outgoing information, and simultaneously enables the customer
to validate that the certificate indeed stems from the amanat. Hence, the protocol satisfies
clauses (i) and (ii).
Figure 1 presents a high-level illustration of the protocol: If the code supplier Sup and
the customer Cus utilize the amanat protocol, they first install an amanat server Ama such
that (a) Cus is assured that Sup is unable to tamper with the amanat, and (b) Sup gains
complete control over the communication link between Ama and Cus. The customer Cus
equips Ama with a public/private key pair, such that Ama can authenticate its messages to
be delivered to Cus. While the public key is handed to Sup, the private key is kept secret
from Sup. Then, once provided with the tools Compiler and Verifier, Ama is ready to com-
pute certified verification verdicts: Sup assembles the sources source and sends them to
Ama. Ama runs Verifier to obtain the outputs logSup and logCus, dedicated to Sup and Cus,
respectively: logSup may contain IP-critical but developement-relevant information, while
logCus is only allowed to contain the verification verdict. Parallel to the verficiation, Ama
uses Compiler to compile the binary exec. Using its private key, Ama computes a certifi-
cate cert which authenticates exec together with logCus as being computed from the same
source. All these results are returned to Sup. Then Sup checks whether all computations
have been performed as expected, i.e., whether exec and logCus resulted from respective
invocations of Compiler and Verifier, and whether cert has been computed properly. Since
the computation of cert involves random bits, the amanat protocol allows Sup to check that
Ama chose these random bits before accessing source—such that they cannot contain any
information on source. If these checks succeed, Sup is assured that the secrecy of its IP
has been preserved. After evaluating logSup and logCus regarding its content, Sup decides
whether to forward exec, logCus, and cert to Cus across the IP boundary or not. If the re-
sults are forwarded to Cus, cert is checked by Cus and if the certificate is valid, Cus accepts
exec and logCus as being conformant.
1.1 Verification by Model Checking and Beyond
Motivated by discussions with industrial collaborators, we primarily intended our protocol
to facilitate software model checking across IP boundaries in a B2B setting where suppliers
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and customers are businesses. Our guiding examples for this setting have been Windows
device drivers and automotive controller software, for which our protocols are practically
feasible with state-of-the-art technology.
Software model checking is now able to verify important properties of simply structured
code [Ball and Rajamani 2001; Henzinger et al. 2002; Chaki et al. 2003; Clarke et al. 2004;
Podelski and Rybalchenko 2007]. Most notably, SLAM/SDV is a fully automatic tool for
a narrow application area, and we expect to see more such tools. Note that SDV has built-
in specifications because the device drivers access and implement a clearly defined API.
Other tools such as Terminator [Cook et al. 2006] and Slayer [Gotsman et al. 2006] do not
require specifications as they are built to verify specific critical properties – termination
and memory-safety, respectively.
Software engineering has become essential in the automotive industries: For example,
the current BMW 7 series implements about 270 user observable features deployed on 67
embedded platforms with approximately 65 MB of binary code [Pretschner et al. 2007].
In 2002, an estimated value of e 127 billion was created by electric, electronics, and soft-
ware components within the automotive domain—and by 2015, this amount is expected to
rise up to e 316 billion [Dannenberg and Kleinhans 2004]. As evolution and integration
have been identified as predominant issues in automotive system software [Pretschner et al.
2007], a number of initiatives have been started to establish standardized and industry-wide
accepted computing environments, most notably the Automotive Open System Architec-
ture (AUTOSAR) [07: 2007a], the Open Systems and the Corresponding Interfaces for
Automotive Electronics (OSEK)1 [07: 2007c], and the Japan Automotive Software Plat-
form Architecture (JASPAR) [07: 2007b]. These standardization efforts originate in the
need to integrate software components developed by various companies along a deep sup-
ply chain. This task demands for verification of both, general requirements to be satisfied
by every component and specific requirements dedicated to individual components—in
presence of heavy IP interests which must be respected and protected [Pretschner et al.
2007].
The amanat protocol provides a general framework to perform source dependent, valida-
tion tasks in presence of IP boundaries and is therefore not restricted to pure verification:
For example, it may be necessary for customers and suppliers to communicate some soft-
ware design details without revealing the underlying source code. In this case, the supplier
can decide to reveal a blueprint of the software, and the amanat can certify the accuracy
of the blueprint by a mutually agreed algorithm. This is possible, because the amanat can
run any verification/validation tool whose output does not compromise the secrecy of the
source code. For example, the amanat protocol is applicable to the following techniques:
(1) apply static analysis tools such as ASTREE [Cousot et al. 2005] and TVLA [Sagiv
et al. 2002].
(2) check the correctness of a proofs provided by Sup, given in, e.g., PVS, ISABELLE,
Coq or another prover [Wiedijk 2006].
(3) evaluate worst case execution times experimentally [Wenzel et al. 2005] or stati-
cally [Ferdinand et al. 2004].
(4) generate white box test cases [Holzer et al. 2008; 2010], and execute them.
1The acronym is derived from the German project name “Offene Systeme und deren Schnittstellen fu¨r die Elek-
tronik in Kraftfahrzeugen”.
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(5) validate that the source code comes with a test suite which satisfies previously agreed
coverage criteria, using e.g. CoverageMeter [CMeter ] or BullseyeCoverage [Bullseye
].
(6) check that the source code is syntactically safe, e.g. using LINT [Darwin 1986].
(7) compute numerical quality and quantity measures which are agreed between Sup and
Cus, e.g. nesting depth, LOC, etc.
(8) compare two versions of the source code, and quantify the difference between them;
this is important in situations where Sup claims charges for a reimplementation.
(9) check if third party IP is included in the source code, e.g. libraries etc.
(10) ensure that certain algorithms are (not) used.
(11) check that the source code is well-documented.
(12) validate the development steps by analyzing the CVS or SVN tree.
(13) ensure compatibility of the source code with language standards.
We note that in all these scenarios the code supplier bears the burden of proof: Ama
is provided with source and must be able to verify—using the tool Verifier alone—that
source and the resulting binary exec are indeed satisfying the specified requirements. To
this end, source may also contain auxiliary information supporting Verifier in computing
the verification verdict. For example, if Verifier uses a theorem prover (as in item 2 above),
then source contains additionally a proof which actually shows the conformance of the
source code to the specification. For most cases mentioned above, at least some auxiliary
information is provided in source, such as command line options, abstraction functions, or
test cases.
It is essential that Ama (more precisely, the agreed upon tool Verifier) only accepts
auxiliary information which helps in proving the required correctness properties more ef-
ficiently but does not take influence on the resulting verdict. For example, a proof for a
theorem prover will help Ama to verify the required properties—but if the provided proof
is wrong or misleading then Ama will not produce a wrongly positive verdict.
1.2 Security of the Amanat Protocol
We present in Sections 4 and 5 cryptographic proofs for the secrecy and conformance
of the amanat verification protocol. Stronger than term-based proofs in the Dolev-Yao
model [Dolev and Yao 1981], these proofs assure that under standard cryptographic as-
sumptions, randomized polynomial time attacks against the protocol (which may involve
e.g. guessing the private keys) can succeed only with negligible probability (for a technical
definition of negligible probability, see the discussion following Definition 7). The prac-
tical security of the protocol is also ensured by its simplicity: As the protocol is based on
well-known cryptographic encryption and signing schemes, it can be implemented with
reasonable effort.
The cryptographic protocols require Cus and Ama to share a secret unknown to Sup,
namely the private key of the customer; this secret enables Ama to authenticate its verdict
to Cus and by computing the certificate. Consequently, the cryptographic proofs need
to assume a physical system configuration and infrastructure where Ama can neither be
reverse-engineered, nor closely monitored by the supplier. On the other hand, from the
point of view of Sup, Ama is an untrusted black box with input and output channels.
For secrecy, the supplier requires ownership of Ama to make sure it will not return to
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the customer after verification. There are two natural scenarios to realize this hardware
configuration:
A Ama is physically located at the site of a trusted third party. All communication chan-
nels of Ama are hardwired to go through a second server, which acts as communication
filter of the supplier, cf. Figure 1.
While scenario A involves a trusted third party, its role is limited to providing physical
security for the servers and requires no expertise beyond server hosting. For the supplier,
scenario A has the disadvantage that the encrypted source has to be sent to the third party,
and thus, to leave the supplier site.
B Ama is physically located at the site of the supplier, but in a sealed location or box
whose integrity is assured through, e.g., regular checks by the customer, a third party, a
traditional alarm system, or the use of sealed hardware [Ravi et al. 2004]. All commu-
nication channels of Ama are hardwired to the communication filter of the supplier.
We believe that in our B2B settings, scenario B is practically feasible: It only requires that
the seal is checked after verification and before deployment. Thus, there is no business
incentive for the supplier to break the seal.
The supplier has total control over the information leaving the production site. Thus,
it can also prevent attempts by the amanat to send messages at specific time points and
to thereby leak information. The supplier can read, delay, drop, and modify all outgoing
messages—which is a convincing and non-technical argument that no sensitive information
is leaking. In our opinion, this simplicity of the amanat protocol is a major advantage for
practical application.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we survey related work and discuss alternative
approaches to the amanat protocol. Afterwards in Section 3, we introduce the relevant
tools and cryptographic primitives, followed by a brief protocol overview, and a detailed
description of the protocol. The secrecy and conformance of the protocol are shown in
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, and the paper is concluded with Section 6.
While the proof on secrecy follows an intuitive argument, the proof of conformance is
technically more involved. We therefore start Section 5 with the theorem stating the con-
formance of the protocol, even before precisely defining the underlying cryptographic as-
sumptions. Subsequently, we introduce these assumptions in Section 5.1, give an overview
on the proof in Section 5.2 and present its details in Sections 5.3 to 5.6.
2. RELATED WORK AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
The last years have seen renewed activity in the analysis of executables from the verifica-
tion and programming languages community. Despite remarkable advances (see e.g. [Bal-
akrishnan and Reps 2007; Debray et al. 1999; Reps et al. 2005; Cifuentes and Fraboulet
1997; Kinder and Veith ]), the computer-aided analysis of executables remains a hard
problem; natural applications are reverse engineering, automatic detection of low level er-
rors such as memory violations, and malicious code detection [Christodorescu et al. 2005;
Kinder et al. 2008]. The technical difficulties in the direct analysis of executables are often
exacerbated by code obfuscation to prevent reverse engineering, or, in the case of malware,
recognition of the malicious code. Although dynamic analysis [Colin and Mariani 2005]
and approaches dealing with black box systems [Lee and Yannakakis 1994; 1996; Peled
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et al. 1999] are relatively immune to obfuscation, they are limited either in the range of
systems they can deal with or in the correctness properties they can assure.
The current paper is orthogonal to executable analysis. We consider a scenario where
the software author is willing to assert the quality of the source code by formal methods,
but does not or provide the source code to the customer.
While proof-Carrying Code [Necula 1997] is able to generate certificates for binaries,
it is only applicable for a restricted class of safety policies. More importantly, a proof for
non-trivial system properties will explain—for all practical purposes—the internal logic of
the binary, and thus, publishing this proof is tantamount to losing intellectual property.
The current paper takes an engineer’s view on computer security, as it exploits the con-
ceptual difference between source code and executable. While we are aware of advanced
methods such as secure multiparty computation [Goldreich 2002] and zero-knowledge
proofs [Ben-Or et al. 1988], we believe that they are impracticable for our problem. To
implement secure multiparty computation, it would be necessary to convert significant
parts of the model checking tool chain into a Boolean circuit which is not a realistic op-
tion. To apply zero-knowledge proofs, one would require the verification tools to produce
highly structured and detailed formal proofs. Except for the provers in item 2 of the list in
Section 1, it is impractical to obtain such proofs by state of the art technology. Finally, we
believe that any advanced method without an intuitive proof for its secrecy will be heav-
ily opposed by the supplier—and might therefore be hard to establish in practice. Thus,
we are convinced that the conceptual simplicity of our protocol is an asset for practical
applicability.
3. THE AMANAT PROTOCOL
The amanat protocol aims to resolve the conflict between the customer Cus who wants to
verify the source code, and the supplier Sup who needs to protect its IP. To this end, the
amanat Ama computes a certificate which contains a verdict on the program correctness,
but does not reveal any information beyond the verdict itself.
3.1 Requirements and Tool Landscape
To make the protocol requirements more precise, we fix some notation and assumptions
about the tool landscape. We restrict our tools to run in deterministic polynomial time to
ensure that their computations can be efficiently reproduced. When we deal with higher
runtime complexities, we pad source, i.e., add a string long enough to upper-bound the
runtime of all tools with a polynomial in the padded length of source. By adding random
seeds to source, we can also integrate randomized tools into our framework.
Definition 1 (Compiler) The compiler Compiler translates an input source into an exe-
cutable exec = Compiler(source) in deterministic polynomial time.
Note that Compiler does not take any further input. In practice, this means that source is a
directory tree and that Compiler is a tool chain composed of compiler, linker etc.
Definition 2 (Verification Tool) The verification tool Verifier takes the input source and
computes in deterministic polynomial time two verification verdicts, logSup and logCus, i.e.,
〈logSup, logCus〉 = Verifier(source).
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Here, logSup is a detailed verdict for the supplier possibly containing IP-critical information
such as counterexamples or witnesses for certain properties. The second output logCus in
contrast contains only uncritical verification verdicts which Sup and Cus have agreed upon
beforehand.
Similar as for the compiler, we assume that Verifier does not take any inputs besides
source. Thus, the specification is included into source—allowing Ama to output the veri-
fication results together with their specifications into logCus. Hence, Sup can check which
properties have been verified by Ama. All auxiliary information necessary to run Verifier
is provided by Sup as part of source, such as command line parameters or abstraction
functions.
As in the case of Compiler, Verifier is not restricted to consist of a single tool. On the
contrary, Verifier can comprise a whole set of verification tools, as long as they are tied
together to produce a single pair 〈logSup, logCus〉 of combined outputs.
Having fixed environment and notation, we paraphrase the requirements in a more pre-
cise manner:
Definition 3 (Conformance) An execution of the amanat protocol is conformant, if the
delivered binary exec and verdict logCus have been produced from the same source.
Definition 4 (Secrecy) An execution of the amanat protocol ensures secrecy, if all infor-
mation provided to Cus in the course of the protocol is either directly contained in or
implied by exec and logCus.
The goal of the Amanat protocol is to give mathematical guarantees for these two prop-
erties for all (but a negligible fraction) of protocol executions—based on two assumptions:
First, the communication channels between Sup, Cus, and Ama must be secure, i.e., the
protocol is not designed to cope with orthogonal risks such as eavesdropping or malicious
manipulations on these channels. Second, we assume that all ingoing and outgoing infor-
mation for Ama is controlled by Sup, i.e., Sup can manipulate all data exchanged between
Ama and Cus.
We note that some of the possible verification tasks discussed in Section 1—in partic-
ular 7, 10, 11—are concerned with non-functional properties of the source code which
do not affect the executable produced by the compiler. However, the conformance prop-
erty only proves to the customer that the obtained binary and its verification verdict stem
from the same source code. Thus, in the case of a legal conflict, a court can only require
the supplier to provide a source code which (i) compiles into the purchased executable,
and (ii) produces the same verification output logCus. There is no mathematical guarantee
however, that the revealed code will be identical to the original code. For example, if the
verdict only indicates whether the delivered executable is deadlock free or not, then the
supplier can decide to not reveal its original source but to provide an obfuscated source
which does not contain any comments and has all identifiers renamed into random strings.
Remark 1 (Preventing Obfuscation) In situations where it is necessary to obtain the
original source, we equip Verifier with (i) a check that source does not have an obfus-
cated appearance, and (ii) a secure hash computation which appends the hash of source to
logCus—leaving the protocol itself unchanged. Then, in case of a conflict, Sup must provide
its original source to match the secure hash.
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3.2 Cryptographic Primitives
Before we formally describe the primitives for encrypting, decrypting, signing and verify-
ing messages, we note that the underlying algorithms are not deterministic but randomized.
This randomization is a countermeasure to attacks against naive implementations of RSA
and other schemes which exploit algebraically related messages, see for example [Dolev
et al. 2000]. In many protocols, the randomization can be treated as technical detail, as
each participant can locally generate random values. But in our protocol, we must en-
sure that the signatures generated by Ama do not contain hidden information for Cus—and
must hence deal with randomization explicitly: Using methods from steganography [Pe-
titcolas and Katzenbeisser 2000], Ama could encode source code properties into allegedly
randomly generated bits. To preclude this possibility, our protocol forces Ama to commit
its random bits before it sees the source code.
Below, we define schemes for encrypting and signing messages. In case of the signature
scheme, we also add procedures with explicit randomization parameters. As both schemes
use an asymmetric key-pair, we assume that the same pair 〈kpriv , kpub〉 can be used for
both. This can be easily achieved by combining the key-pairs for both schemes into a
single pair.
Definition 5 (Public-Key Encryption Scheme) Given a key pair 〈kpriv , kpub〉, we define
the encryption and decryption and their respectively required computational complexity
bound (with respect to length of their inputs and security parameters) as follows:
—Encryption: For a plaintext message m, we write c = kpub(m) to denote the encryption
of m with key kpub yielding the ciphertext c (probabilistic polynomial time).
—Decryption: Similarly, m = kpriv (c) denotes the decryption of the ciphertext c with key
kpriv resulting again in the original message m (deterministic polynomial time).
Definition 6 (Public-Key Signature Scheme) Given a key pair 〈kpriv , kpub〉, we define
the following operations running in deterministic polynomial time (with respect to length
of their inputs and the security parameter):
—Signature Generation: We write s = csign(kpriv ,m,R) for the signature s of a message
m signed with key kpriv and generated with random seed R.
—Signature Verification: cverify(kpub ,m, s) denotes the verification result of a signature
s for message m with key kpriv . The verification succeeds, iff there exists a random seed
R such that s = csign(kpriv ,m,R) holds.
—Random Seed Extraction: We write R = cextract(s) for s = csign(kpriv ,m,R) to
extract the random seed R used in a signature s generated for message m with key kpriv .
—Signature Verification with Fixed Random Seed: We write cverify(kpub ,m, s, R) to
check whether a signature s for message m and kpriv has been generated with random
seed R, i.e., cverify(kpub ,m, s, R) succeeds iff s = csign(kpriv ,m,R) holds.
Thus, besides standard signature generation and verification with csign(kpriv ,m,R) and
cverify(kpub ,m, s), respectively, we require the existence of two additional procedures:
The first one, cextract(s) extracts the random seed R used in signature s, and the second
one, cverify(kpub ,m, s, R) verifies that signature s has been generated with random seed
R.
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Aside providing these interfaces, suitable cryptographic primitives must also satisfy the
relevant security properties, as defined in Section 5.1: In case of the encryption scheme,
our requirements are fairly standard and are satisfied by a number of encryption schemes,
e.g. one can use ElGamal encryption [ElGamal 1985]. For the signature scheme, we pro-
pose to use [Cramer and Shoup 2000] which is based upon RSA [Rivest et al. 1978] and
SHA [NIST 1995] and allows to implement all operations described above.
3.3 Summary Description of the Protocol
Our protocol is based on the principle that Cus trusts Ama, and thus, Cus believes that a
verification verdict logCus originating from Ama is conformant with a corresponding bi-
nary exec. Therefore, Cus and Sup install Ama at Sup’s site such that Sup can use Ama
to generate trusted verification verdicts subsequently. At the same time, Sup controls all
the communication to and from Ama and consequently Sup is able to prohibit the commu-
nication of any piece of information beyond the verification verdict, i.e., Sup can enforce
the secrecy of its IP. To ensure that Sup does not alter the verdict of Ama, Ama signs the
verdicts with a key which is only known to Ama and Cus but not to Sup. Also, to en-
sure that the tools Compiler and Verifier given to Ama are untampered, Sup must provide
certificates which guarantee that these tools have been approved by Cus.
A protocol based on this simple idea does ensure the conformance property, but a naive
implementation with common cryptographic primitives fails to guarantee secrecy: As ar-
gued above, the certificates generated by Ama involve random seeds, and Sup cannot check
these random seeds for hidden information. In our protocol, to prohibit such hidden trans-
mission of information, Ama is not allowed to generate the required random seeds after it
has accessed source. Instead, Ama generates a large supply of random seeds before it has
access to source, and sends them to Sup. In this way, Ama commits to the random seeds.
Later, Sup checks that Ama used exactly these random values. Thus, Ama is not able to
encode any information about source into these seeds.
The only remaining problem is that Sup is not allowed to know the random seeds in
advance, since it could use this knowledge to compromise the cryptographic security of
the certificates computed by Ama. Therefore, Ama encrypts each random seed with a
specific key before transmitting them to Sup, and reveals the corresponding key when it
uses one of its seeds.
3.4 Detailed Protocol Description
Our protocol consists of three phases, namely the installation, session initialization, and
certification.
Installation Phase: Cus initializes Ama with a master key pair 〈kmpriv , kmpub〉 which
is used later to exchange a session key pair. Then, Ama is transported to and installed at the
designated site. All further communication between Ama and Cus is controlled by Sup.
I1 Master Key Generation [ Cus ]
Cus generates the master keys 〈kmpriv , kmpub〉 and initializes Ama with them.
I2 Installation of the Amanat [ Sup, Cus ]
Ama is installed at Sup’s site and Sup receives kmpub .
Session Initialization Phase: After installation, Sup and Cus must agree on a specific
Verifier and Compiler. Once Verifier and Compiler have been fixed, the session initializa-
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tion phase starts: First, Cus generates a new pair of session keys 〈kspriv , kspub〉 and sends
them to Ama via Sup—having encrypted the private key kspriv beforehand. Then, the
new session keys are used to produce certificates certVerifier and certCompiler for Verifier and
Compiler, respectively. Sup checks the contents of the certificates. If they are valid, it uses
them to setup Ama with Verifier and Compiler. Ama in turn accepts Verifier and Compiler
if their certificates are valid.
In the last initialization step, Ama generates a supply of random seeds R1, . . . , Rt for t
subsequent executions of the certification phase. It also generates a sequence of key pairs
〈kr1priv , kr
1
pub〉, . . . , 〈kr
t
priv , kr
t
pub〉 for each random seed Ri. Ama finally encrypts each
random seed to obtain and send kr ipub(Ri) to Sup. Ama and Sup both maintain a variable
round which is initialized to 0 and incremented by 1 for each execution of the certification
phase.
S1 Session Key Generation [ Cus, Sup ]
Cus generates the session keys 〈kspriv , kspub〉 and sends kmpub(kspriv ) and kspub to
Sup. Sup forwards kmpub(kspriv ) and kspub unchanged to Ama.
S2 Generation of the Tool Certificates [ Cus ]
Cus computes the certificates
—certVerifier = csign(kspriv ,Verifier) and
—certCompiler = csign(kspriv ,Compiler).
Cus sends both certificates to Sup.
S3 Supplier Validation of the Tool Certificates [ Sup ]
Sup checks the contents of the certificates, i.e., Sup checks that
—cverify(kspub,Verifier, certVerifier) and
—cverify(kspub,Compiler, certCompiler) succeed.
If one of the checks fails, Sup aborts the protocol.
S4 Amanat Tool Transmission [ Sup ]
Sup sends Verifier, Compiler, and the certificates certVerifier and certCompiler to Ama.
S5 Amanat Validation of the Tool Certificates [ Ama ]
Ama checks whetherVerifier andCompiler are properly certified, i.e., it checks whether
—cverify(kspub,Verifier, certVerifier) and
—cverify(kspub,Compiler, certCompiler) succeed.
If this check fails, Ama refuses to process any further input.
S6 Amanat Random Seed Generation [ Ama ]
Ama generates
—a series of random seeds R1, . . . , Rt together with a series of corresponding key
pairs 〈kr1priv , kr
1
pub〉, . . . , 〈kr
t
priv , kr
t
pub〉,
—encrypts the random seeds with the corresponding keys kr ipub(Ri) for i = 1, . . . , t,
and
—initializes round counter round = 0.
Ama sends kr ipub(Ri) and kr ipub for i = 1, . . . , t to Sup.
Certification Phase: Ama is now ready for the certification phase, i.e., it will accept
source to produce a certified verdict on source which can be forwarded to Cus and whose
trustworthy origin can be checked by Cus.
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During certification, Ama runs Verifier and Compiler on source and generates a certifi-
cate cert for the binary exec and the verification output logCus dedicated to Cus. The cer-
tificate is based upon the random seed Rround which Ama committed to use in this round
during session initialization. Ama sends the certificate cert, the outputs logSup and logCus,
and the key kr roundpriv to Sup.
To validate secrecy, Sup computes the random seed Rround = kr roundpriv (krpub(Rround))
which Ama supposedly used for the generation of cert. Then Sup checks that the certificate
cert is valid and based upon the random seed Rround. If this is the case, Ama cannot hide
any unintended information in the certificates. Otherwise, if the checks fails, Sup aborts the
protocol. If Sup proceeds and the obtained verdict is good enough, it forwards the results
to Cus. Otherwise, it might revise source and start a new certification phase. Finally, when
Cus receives exec, logCus, and cert, it checks conformance exec and logCus using cert.
C1 Source Code Transmission [ Sup ]
Sup sends source to Ama.
C2 Source Code Verification by the Amanat [ Ama ]
Ama computes
—the verdict 〈logSup, logCus〉 = Verifier(source) of Verifier on source,
—the binary exec = Compiler(source),
—increments the round counter round, and
—cert = csign(kspriv , 〈exec, logCus〉 ,Rround).
Ama sends exec, logSup, logCus, cert, and kr roundpriv to Sup.
C3 Secrecy Validation [ Sup ]
Upon receiving exec, logSup, logCus, cert, and kr roundpriv , Sup
—decrypts the random seed with Rround = kr roundpriv (kr roundpub (Rround)),
—checks whether exec = Compiler(source) and 〈logSup, logCus〉 = Verifier(source)
hold, and
—verifies that cverify(kspub, 〈exec, logCus〉 , cert,Rround) succeeds.
If the checks fails, Sup concludes that the secrecy requirement has been violated,
and refuses to proceed with the protocol.
Otherwise, Sup evaluates logCus and logSup and decides whether to deliver exec, logCus,
and cert to Cus in step C4 or whether to abort the protocol.
C4 Conformance Validation [ Cus ]
Having received exec, logCus, and cert, Cus verifies that certificate is valid, i.e., that
cverify(kspub, 〈exec, logCus〉 , cert) succeeds.
If the checks fails, Cus concludes that the conformance requirement has been vio-
lated, and refuses to proceed with the protocol.
Otherwise Cus evaluates the contents of logCus and decides whether the verification
verdict supports the purchase of the product exec.
4. PROTOCOL SECRECY
We designed the amanat protocol aiming at a simple and intuitive argument for its secrecy,
as such a straightforward proof is a prerequisite to convince a code supplying company
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that the protocol keeps their highly valued IP assets safe. For the same reason, we do not
rely on any cryptographic assumptions to prove the secrecy of the amanat protocol.
The idea behind this proof is straightforward: As the certificate cert is the only place to
transmit additional information from Ama to Cus, we make sure that cert can be computed
without knowing the source itself. Hence, no information on the source can be possibly
hidden in cert.
Theorem 1 (Secrecy) The amanat protocol enforces secrecy (see Definition 4) in all its
executions unconditionally.
This means that Cus is unable extract any piece of information on the source source
which is not contained in exec and logCus in any case and independently from any crypto-
graphic assumptions.
PROOF. During the execution of the protocol, Cus receives the binary exec, the output
file logCus, and the certificate cert. The certificate cert = csign(kspriv , 〈exec, logCus〉,Rround)
is generated from exec, logCus, the key kspriv , and the random seed Rround. Cus generates
kspriv itself and obtains access to exec and to logCus. Thus the only additional information
communicated from Ama to Sup stems from the random seed Rround. But Rround has been
fixed by Ama before having access to source and only depends on the iteration counter
round. Thus, Ama cannot encode any information from source into Rround—such that the
certificate depends on exec and logCus only.
Note that the order of the random seeds R1, . . . , Rt must be predetermined: Otherwise,
Ama could choose a random seed Ri after evaluating source according to some conspira-
tive scheme Ama and Cus agreed upon.
5. PROTOCOL CONFORMANCE
We prove the conformance of our protocol using standard cryptographic assumptions: Fol-
lowing [Goldreich 2004], we assume that the public-key encryption is semantically secure
and that the signature scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks, such as
the RSA-based scheme proposed in [Cramer and Shoup 2000]. Assuming these security
properties, we obtain the conformance of our protocol under all practically relevant condi-
tions.
Theorem 2 (Conformance) If the protocol terminates (in Step C4 of the certification
phase) with the customer Cus accepting the certificate, then the protocol execution has
been conformant in all but a negligible fraction of the cases.
We assume that (a) the underlying encryption is semantically secure, (b) the signature
scheme is secure against adaptively chosen message attacks, and (c) the supplier Sup runs
in probabilistic polynomial time.
To prove this theorem, we recall in Section 5.1 the stated security properties, discuss in
Section 5.2 the proof structure, and concretize the proof throughout Sections 5.3 to 5.6.
5.1 Security Properties
Semantic security means that a probabilistic polynomial time adversary cannot learn more
from the ciphertext than from the length of the plaintext alone.
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Definition 7 (Semantic Security [Goldreich 2004]) A public-key encryption scheme (Def-
inition 5) is semantically secure if for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A,
there exist a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A′ and an integer N , such that for
every choice of Xn, f , h, p, n ≥ N , and randomly chosen public key kpub ,
Pr
[
A(1n, kpub , kpub(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)
]
< Pr
[
A′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)
]
+ 1/p(n)
holds. Therein, Xn is a random variable of arbitrarily distributed plaintexts, f and h are
functions in the security parameter n and the plaintext Xn which both yield a result of
polynomial length, and p is a polynomial.
In this definition, we have two procedures A and A′, where A′ receives the same in-
formation as A—except for the public key kpub and the ciphertext kpub(Xn) which are
dropped.
In many attacks on a public-key encryption scheme, the attacker does not only receive
some ciphertexts but also obtains some related information. To model this situation, the
function h(1n, Xn) is used to provide both, A and A′, with further information depending
on the plaintext Xn.
Then an encryption scheme is defined as semantically secure, if for every A there exists
an A′ such that the probability that A and A′ differ in their results is at most negligible,
i.e., both compute the same function up to a negligible fraction of the cases. Thereby,
we say that a function f : N → R is negligible, iff there exits an integer N for every
polynomial p such that for all n ≥ N , f(n) < 1/p(n) holds. When a probabilistic
experiment parameterized with n has negligible success probability, then we mean that
this success probability as function in the parameter n is negligible. See [Goldreich 2004]
for more details.
An adaptive chosen message attack is an attack against a signature scheme, where the
attacker is given a public key and access to an oracle which can sign arbitrary messages
with the corresponding private key. The attacker generates a number of messages to be
signed by the oracle. The generated messages may depend on each other, on the public
key itself, and—since the attack is adaptive—on the signatures previously returned by the
oracle. The attack procedure must then compute a message and a corresponding signature
which has not been signed before by the oracle.
If every probabilistic polynomial time attacker is only successful in forging a signa-
ture with a negligible probability, then we say that the signature scheme is secure against
adaptive chosen message attacks.
Definition 8 (Adaptive Chosen Message Attack [Cramer and Shoup 2000]) Given
a public key-pair 〈kpriv , kpub〉 for a signature scheme, a signing oracle S[kpriv ] with
private key kpriv is a function which takes a message m and returns a signature s =
csign(kpriv ,m,R) for a uniformly and randomly chosen random seed R. A forging algo-
rithm F (kpub) receives the public key kpub and has access to the signing oracle S[kpriv ],
where kpriv is the private key corresponding to kpub .
The algorithm F is allowed to query S[kpriv ] for an arbitrary number of signatures.
F can adaptively choose the messages to be signed, i.e., each newly chosen message can
depend on the outcome of the previous queries. At the end of the computation, a successful
attackF must output a messagem and a signature s such that cverify(kpub ,m, s) succeeds,
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although m has never been sent to and signed by S[kpriv ].
A signature scheme (Definition 6) is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks, if
every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm F has only a negligible success probability.
Assuming that the encryption scheme is semantically secure and that the signature scheme
is secure against adaptive chosen message attacks, we start the conformance proof.
5.2 Proof Overview
For the sake of contradiction, we assume that Sup is able to trick Cus into accepting a
forged pair 〈exec, logCus〉 with a not negligible success probability, i.e., Sup computes
a certificate cert for a pair 〈exec, logCus〉 which has not been computed and signed by
Ama but is nevertheless accepted by Cus. Starting from this assumption, we derive a
contradiction in four steps.
1. Modeling the Supplier (Section 5.3). As a first step in the proof, we introduce in Fact 1
and 2 two procedures Sup gen and Sup val which model the computations of a honest
supplier in Steps C1 and C3 respectively. Then each step of the supplier Sup corresponds
to a single call to one of these two procedures: In each call, we provide the procedure
with all information which has been made available to Sup during the protocol execution
so far. After each call, the procedures Sup gen and Sup val return all information which
is necessary to continue the protocol execution. Since Sup can maintain an internal state
between the individual protocol steps, we also introduce a variable state which is given to
both procedures Sup gen and Sup val by reference, i.e., they can access and update this
variable state.
2. A first Forging Procedure (Section 5.4). Since a malicious supplier is assumed to
exist, there must exist a corresponding pair of procedures MSup gen and MSup val im-
plementing the malicious behavior of this supplier: These procedures MSup gen and
MSup val are only restricted to support the same interface as Sup gen and Sup val and to
respect a probabilistic polynomial time bound. We use MSup gen and MSup val to build
a first forging procedure Forge1: This procedure simulates the possibly repeated certifi-
cate phase of the Amanat protocol such that MSup gen and MSup val cannot distinguish
this simulation from a real protocol execution. Since they are unable to distinguish the
simulation from a real protocol execution, they will behave exactly the same way—and
consequently, in Proposition 1 we conclude that Forge1 produces the same result as a real
protocol execution. In the remainder of the proof, this procedure is transformed via an
intermediate procedure Forge2 into the final attack algorithm Forge3.
3. Removing the Random Seeds and the Private Key (Section 5.5). The procedureForge1
is not directly usable to forge certificates, since it uses the private kspriv which is supposed
to be unknown to Forge1. Hence, we want to use the signing oracle S[kspriv ] instead; but
when we rely on S[kspriv ] to generate certificates, we must also avoid referring to the yet
unused certificate random seeds Rround+1, . . . , Rt (since the choices of S[kspriv ] for these
seeds are unpredictable). Within Forge1, MSup gen and MSup val both receive the ses-
sion key and the random seeds in an encrypted manner, i.e., they take kmpub(kspriv ) and
kr
round+1
pub (Rround+1), . . . , kr
t
pub(Rt) as arguments. Because kspriv and Rround+1, . . . , Rt
are passed on in an encrypted manner, we can apply semantic security to remove the
respective arguments (Lemmata 1 and 2). In particular, we prove the existence of two
ACM Journal Name, Vol. 2, No. 3, 09 2001.
16 · Sagar Chaki, Christian Schallhart, and Helmut Veith
procedures MSup gen and MSup val: They receive the same arguments as their original
counterparts—except for the encrypted session key and the encrypted, yet unused random
seeds—but return the same output as MSup gen and MSup val, respectively. Next, in
Lemma 3 and Corollary 1, we show that we can substitute MSup gen and MSup val for
MSup gen and MSup val in any probabilistic polynomial time procedure—again without
changing the result of the procedure. Lemmata 1 to 3 hold in all but a negligible fraction
of the cases.
4. The Proof of Theorem 2 (Section 5.6). Lemma 3 applies to Forge1 since it is a prob-
abilistic polynomial time procedure. Therefore, we replace in Forge1 MSup gen and
MSup val with their counterparts MSup gen and MSup val to obtain Forge2. Since Forge2
uses the private key kspriv for signing only and does not make any use of the random seeds
Rround+1, . . . , Rt, we can replace all references to kspriv with its signing oracle S[kspriv ]
to obtain Forge3. This procedureForge3 is the sought for adaptive chosen message attack—
contradicting the assumption that no such attack exists.
In the proof below, we assume that all procedures receive the security parameter 1n
implicitly as their first parameter. We also assume that their computations are polynomially
bounded in n and the length of their other inputs.
5.3 Modeling the Supplier
To introduce the two procedures Sup gen and Sup val which perform all computations of
the supplier Sup during the certification phase, we observe that the supplier receives the
following pieces of information during the installation, session initialization, and possibly
repeated certification phase:
—The encrypted random seeds kr ipub(Ri) and the respective public keys kr
i
pub for i =
1, . . . , t are sent to Sup in Step S6.
—The accumulated inputs source, exec, logSup, logCus, cert, and kr roundpriv are sent to Sup at
the end of Step C2 of all previous certification phases.
—All remaining messages of the initialization and session initialization phase comprise the
following information: kmpub (I2), kmpub(kspriv ) and kspub (S1), as well as certVerifier
and certCompiler (S2).
We model the accumulated state of Sup with an additional variable state. This variable
state is given to Sup gen and Sup val by reference, i.e., both procedures and can access
and update its contents. Initially, state contains all messages seen or generated by Sup
during the initialization and session initialization phase (kmpub , kspub, certCompiler, and
certVerifier). The encrypted key kmpub(kspriv ) is handled explicitly and is therefore not
added to state. During a number of repeated certification phases, Sup can also accumulate
and store information on the received instances of source, exec, logSup, logCus, and cert in
state.
Fact 1 (Modeling Sup for Step C1: Sup gen) The computation of the supplier Sup in Step
C1 of the certification phase are modeled with a call
source = Sup gen (state, kmpub(kspriv ),
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
t
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
t
pub(Rt),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv )
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where state is the state of Sup, kmpub(kspriv ) is the encrypted session key, round is the
protocol parameter being incremented with each iteration of the certification phase, and t
is the total number of precomputed random seeds.
Fact 2 (Modeling Sup for Step C3: Sup val) The computation of the supplier Sup in Step
C3 of the certification phase can be modeled with a call
result = Sup val (state, kmpub(kspriv ), cert,
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
t
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
t
pub(Rt),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv )
where state is the state of Sup, kmpub(kspriv ) is the encrypted session key, cert is the
certificate produced for the formerly generated source, round is the protocol parameter
being incremented with each iteration of the certification phase, t is the total number of
precomputed random seeds, and result indicates either
—to continue the protocol at Step C4 (in this case result contains a pair 〈exec, logCus〉 and
a corresponding but possibly forged cert to be sent to the Cus),
—to abort the protocol and start again at Step C1, or
—to refuse to work with Ama since a secrecy violation has been detected.
In Fact 2, Sup val is only receiving cert while Sup receives in Step C2 exec, logSup,
and logCus, as well. However, Sup val can compute these pieces of information itself with
exec = Compiler(source) and 〈logSup, logCus〉 = Verifier(source). To do so, Sup gen
stores source in state.
Note that we have to call Sup gen and Sup val in an alternating manner in order to ensure
that these two procedures cannot distinguish a simulation from a real protocol execution:
This is necessary since state can be used to communicate information from Sup gen to
Sup val and since they are called in an alternating manner in the original protocol.
5.4 A first Forging Procedure
We assume that there exists a malicious supplierMSupwhich produces a pair 〈exec, logCus〉
and a certificate cert within probabilistic polynomial time at a not negligible probability
such that
—Cus accepts the pair and its certificate in Step C4, but
—Ama did not produce the certificate cert for 〈exec, logCus〉.
We model this malicious supplier with two procedures MSup gen and MSup val, which
run in probabilistic polynomial time and have the same interface as Sup gen and Sup val,
as described in Facts 1 and 2.
Now we use the two malicious procedures to build a probabilistic polynomial time forg-
ing algorithm Forge1. More specifically, Forge1 embeds MSup gen and MSup val in a
simulated execution of the amanat protocol, consisting of a single execution of the ses-
sion initialization phase and a possibly repeated execution of the certification phase. Since
MSup gen and MSup val cannot distinguish the simulation from the real protocol execu-
tion, the success probability of Forge1 is identical to the success probability of the orig-
inal malicious supplier. More specifically, the procedure Forge1 takes as input a session
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key-pair 〈kspriv , kspub〉 and—given the malicious character of MSup gen andMSup val—
produces with not negligible probability a forged signature for this key-pair: After comput-
ing with kspriv a number of signatures, Forge1 uses the accumulated information to forge
a signature, i.e., it computes a signature without using kspriv . However, MSup gen and
MSup val do require access to the encrypted session key and random seeds—which is the
problem addressed in the following sections.
F11 Key and Random Seed Generation
Simulate the session initialization phase:
—Generate a sequence
〈kr1priv , kr
1
pub〉, . . . , 〈kr
t
priv , kr
t
pub〉 of key pairs.
—Generate a sequence R1, . . . , Rt of random seeds.
—Generate a master key pair 〈kmpriv , kmpub〉.
—Set round = 0.
—Initialize state with kmpub , kspub, certCompiler, and certVerifier .
F21 Source Code Computation
Simulate Step C1 with a call
source = MSup gen (state, kmpub(kspriv ),
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
t
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
t
pub(Rt),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv ).
F31 Source Code Verification
Simulate Step C2 by computing
—〈logSup, logCus〉 = Verifier(source) and
—exec = Compiler(source),
—incrementing round by 1, and
—computing the certificate
cert = csign(kspriv , 〈logCus, exec〉,Rround).
F41 Secrecy Validation (Forge Certificate)
Simulate Step C3, i.e., make a call
result = MSup val (state, kmpub(kspriv ), cert,
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
t
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
t
pub(Rt),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv ).
Depending on result, the execution proceeds with
—Step F51, if result indicates to continue the protocol (in this case result contains
〈exec, logCus〉 and cert, where cert is forged with not negligible probability).
—Step F21, if result indicates to start over again.
—an erroneous abort, if result indicates that a secrecy violation has been detected.
F51 Output Result
Output the pair 〈exec, logCus〉 and cert as indicated by result.
The procedure Forge1 simulates the repeated execution of the certification phase after
a preceding initialization and session initialization phase. The procedure MSup gen and
MSup val cannot distinguish between the protocol execution and the simulation within
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Forge1 and therefore, Forge1 produces a forged certificate in Step F51 with the same prob-
ability as the original supplier MSup in a protocol execution. This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 (The Procedure Forge1) Let MSup gen and MSup val model a malicious
supplier which is able to produce a non-conformant pair 〈exec, logCus〉 with a valid (i.e.,
forged) certificate cert with not negligible probability. Then, with non negligible proba-
bility, the procedure Forge1 outputs a forged certificate in Step F51, i.e., one that has not
been signed before in Step F31.
However, both procedures MSup gen and MSup val are provided with the encrypted
session key kmpub(kspriv ) and the sequence kr1pub(R1), . . . , kr
t
pub(Rt), i.e., Sup receives
in advance all random seeds which are used subsequently for certificates. Since we want
to use this procedure to mount an adaptive chosen messages attack (Definition 8), we need
to replace all direct references to kspriv with queries to a signing oracle S[kspriv ]. But
a signing oracle chooses its random seeds independently, and therefore we have to cut
down the sequence kr1pub(R1), . . . , kr tpub(Rt) to kr1pub(R1), . . . , kr roundpub (Rround), i.e., no
information on the random seeds Rround+1, . . . , Rt is allowed to be received by Sup in
advance.
5.5 Removing the Random Seeds and the Private Key
As the random seeds kr round+1pub (Rround+1), . . . , kr
t
pub(Rt) and the private key kmpub(kspriv )
are all encrypted, we can use the assumption that the encryption scheme is semantically
secure, as defined in Definition 7. We first deal with MSup gen and then draw analogous
conclusions for MSup val.
Lemma 1 (Removing Encrypted Seeds: MSup gen) For each probabilistic polynomial
time procedure MSup gen which implements the signature of Fact 1, there exists another
probabilistic polynomial time procedure MSup gen with the signature
source = MSup gen (state,
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
round
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
round
pub (Rround),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv )
such that for each polynomial q and sufficiently large n
Pr
[
MSup gen(. . .) = MSup gen(. . .)
]
> 1− 1/q(n)
holds.
PROOF. Fix a procedure MSup gen and a protocol parameter t which is set to the max-
imum number of certification phases, i.e., the number of pre-committed random seeds.
Then we start with the t-th random seed Rt and remove the references to kr tpub and
kr
t
pub(Rt). Next, we remove references to kr
t−1
pub and kr
t
pub(Rt−1), and so forth, until
we reach kr roundpub and kr
round
pub (Rround).
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To apply Definition 7, we define h as constant function with
h(Rt) = (state, kmpub(kspriv ),
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
t−1
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
t−1
pub (Rt−1),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
t−1
priv ).
After permuting some arguments of MSup gen, we can rewrite a call to MSup gen as
MSup gen(kr tpub , kr
t
pub(Rt), h(Rt))
and set
f(Rt) = MSup gen(kr
t
pub , kr
t
pub(Rt), h(Rt)).
Please recall that we omit the implicit security parameter in our procedure headers, since
then—by adding the implicit security parameter 1n again—this setting matches precisely
the prerequisites of Definition 7. Thus, by the semantic security of the encryption scheme,
there exists a corresponding procedure MSup gen′(h(Rt)) with
Pr
[
MSup gen(kr tpub , kr
t
pub(Rt), h(Rt)) = f(Rt)
]
< Pr
[
MSup gen′(h(Rt)) = f(Rt)
]
+ 1
p(n)
for every polynomial p and sufficiently large n. Since f computes MSup gen, the first
probability equals 1, yielding
Pr[MSup gen′(h(Rt)) = MSup gen(. . .)] > 1−
1
p(n)
.
Then, for an arbitrary polynomial q, we set p(n) = (t − round + 1)q(n) and iterate the
above process (t− round) times, to obtain—for arbitrary q and sufficiently large n—
Pr[MSup gen′′(. . .) = MSup gen(. . .)]
>
(
1− 1
p(n)
)t−round
=
(
1− 1(t−round+1)q(n)
)t−round
where we call MSup gen′′(. . .) with signature
MSup gen′′ (state, kmpub(kspriv ),
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
round
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
round
pub (Rround),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv ).
It remains to remove kmpub(kspriv ) which can be done with one further application of the
encryption scheme’s semantic security. Then we arrive at
Pr[MSup gen(. . .) = MSup gen(. . .)]
>
(
1− 1(t−round+1)q(n)
)t−round+1
≥ 1− 1
q(n)
which is the Lemma statement.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. 2, No. 3, 09 2001.
Verification Across Intellectual Propery Boundaries · 21
By substituting MSup val for MSup gen, we obtain in a completely analogous manner
the next lemma:
Lemma 2 (Removing Encrypted Seeds: MSup val) For each procedureMSup valwhich
runs in probabilistic polynomial time and implements the signature of Fact 2, there exists
another probabilistic polynomial time procedure MSup val with the signature
result = MSup val (state, cert,
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
round
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
round
pub (Rround),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv )
such that for each polynomial q and sufficiently large n
Pr
[
MSup val(. . .) = MSup val(. . .)
]
> 1− 1/q(n)
holds.
Thus, starting from a malicious supplier which is modeled by two probabilistic polyno-
mial time procedures MSup gen and MSup val, we obtain by application of Lemmata 1
and 2 two other probabilistic polynomial time procedures MSup gen and MSup val which
both
—do not receive any encrypted random seed—besides those which have been used already,
—do not receive the encrypted key kmpub(kspriv ), and
—return the same result as their original counterparts in all but a negligible fraction of the
cases.
The same holds true for general polynomial time computations which involve MSup gen
and MSup val:
Lemma 3 (Substituting MSup gen and MSup val) Let A1 be a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm which invokes MSup gen and MSup val (as defined in Fact 1 and 2).
Furthermore, let A2 be the procedure obtained from A1 by substituting MSup gen and
MSup val (taken from Lemmata 1 and 2) for MSup gen and MSup val, respectively. Then
A2 and A1 compute deviating results with a negligible probability only.
PROOF. Since A1 and A2 run within polynomial time, they can only invoke their re-
spective subprocedures a polynomial number of times and therefore, their results deviate
only if at least one of their polynomial many subprocedure invocations deviates.
But if we repeat an experiment with negligible success probability a polynomial number
of times, then the probability of observing at least one successful attempt is still negligible
(see for example the introduction of [Goldreich 2004]).
Thus, invoking MSup gen and MSup val a polynomial number of times will produce
deviations only with negligible probability—and consequently, A1 and A2 produce the
same result in all but a negligible fraction of the cases.
In the proof of Theorem 2, we use the following consequence of Lemma 3:
Corollary 1 (Preserving a Not Negligible Success Prob.) Let the procedures A1 and A2
be given as described in Lemma 3. Then A1 computes a result successfully with a not neg-
ligible probability iff A2 has a not negligible success probability for the same computation.
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PROOF. We show equivalently that A1 computes some result with a negligible proba-
bility iff A2 has a negligible success probability for the same computation.
For A2 to be successful, one of two cases must arise: Either A1 is successful (and
the results of A1 and A2 coincide), or the results of A1 and A2 deviate (and A1 is not
successful). Thus, the success probability of A2 is bounded by the probability that either
A1 is successful or that the results of A1 and A2 deviate.
The success probability of A1 is negligible, as well as the probability that the results
of A1 and A2 deviate. Consequently, the probability that A2 succeeds is negligible. By
exchanging A1 and A2, the converse follows and the statement is proved for both direc-
tions.
5.6 Proof of Theorem 2
In the final proof, we use Forge1, as provided in Section 5.4 and apply Lemma 3 to Forge1
to obtain the procedure Forge2. Then, Forge2 has the following properties:
—The random seeds to be used in future rounds are not referenced in advance.
—The result computed by Forge2 deviates from Forge1 only in a negligible fraction of
the cases. By assumption, Forge1 produces a forged certificate with a not negligible
probability, and thus the same holds true for Forge2.
It remains to replace all references to the private session key kspriv with queries to the
signing oracle S[kspriv ] to obtain a forging procedure Forge3 which matches Definition 8
of an adaptive chosen message attack:
Proof (of Theorem 2): We apply Lemma 3 to Forge1 as defined in Section 5.4 to obtain
Forge2 which produces forged certificates with not negligible probability by Corollary 1.
Below, we show the transformed procedure Forge2, which uses kspriv only to generate
signatures.
F12 Key and Random Seed Generation
Simulate the session initialization phase:
—Generate a sequence
〈kr1priv , kr
1
pub〉, . . . , 〈kr
t
priv , kr
t
pub〉 of key pairs.
—Generate a sequence R1, . . . , Rt of random seeds.
—Generate a master key pair 〈kmpriv , kmpub〉.
—Set round = 0.
—Initialize state with kmpub , kspub, certCompiler, and certVerifier .
F22 Source Code Computation
Simulate Step C1 with a call
source = MSup gen (state,
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
round
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
round
pub (Rround),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv ).
F32 Source Code Verification
Simulate Step C2 by computing
—〈logSup, logCus〉 = Verifier(source) and
—exec = Compiler(source),
—incrementing round by 1, and
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—computing the certificate
cert = csign(kspriv , 〈logCus, exec〉,Rround).
F42 Secrecy Validation (Forge Certificate)
Simulate Step C3, i.e., make a call
result = MSup val (state, cert,
kr
1
pub , . . . , kr
round
pub ,
kr
1
pub(R1), . . . , kr
round
pub (Rround),
kr
1
priv , . . . , kr
round
priv ).
Depending on result, the execution proceeds with
—Step F52, if result indicates to continue.
—Step F22, if result indicates to start over again.
—an erroneous abort, if result indicates that a secrecy violation has been detected.
F52 Output Result
Output the pair 〈exec, logCus〉 and cert as indicated by result.
Based on Forge2, we build the attack procedure Forge3 with two further modifications
such that they do not change the not negligible success probability of the overall procedure.
—First, in Step F12, we drop the precomputation of the random seeds R1, . . . , Rt.
—Second, in Step F32, we rely on the signing oracle S[kspriv ] to generate the certifi-
cate cert, and obtain with cextract the random seed that has been used by the oracle to
compute the last certificate.
The success probability remains the same, since MSup gen and MSup val cannot detected
the modifications, and since the random seeds R1, . . . , Rt are generated in both cases
according to the uniform distribution. Below, we show the updated Steps F13 and F33,
while the other ones remain the same.
F13 Key and Random Seed Generation
Simulate the session initialization phase:
—Generate a sequence
〈kr1priv , kr
1
pub〉, . . . , 〈kr
t
priv , kr
t
pub〉 of key pairs.
—Generate a master key pair 〈kmpriv , kmpub〉.
—Set round = 0.
—Initialize state with kmpub , kspub, certCompiler, and certVerifier .
F33 Source Code Verification
Simulate Step C2 by computing
—〈logSup, logCus〉 = Verifier(source) and
—exec = Compiler(source),
—incrementing round by 1,
—computing the certificate with the signing oracle cert = S[kspriv ](〈logCus, exec〉),
and
—extract the random seed Rround = cextract(cert) from the certificate cert.
Since Forge2 has a not negligible chance to forge certificates, and since the output of
Forge3 is not changed by the last two changes, Forge3 has a not negligible chance to forge
certificates as well. Moreover, Forge3 accesses the private key kspriv only in terms of the
signing oracle S[kspriv ], and runs in probabilistic polynomial time.
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In other words, Forge3 is a successful adaptive chosen message attack, as defined in
Definition 8. This is a contradiction and concludes the proof. 
6. CONCLUSION
IP boundaries impose an obstacle in the dissemination and application of verification tech-
niques. In the commonly considered verification scenario, a relationship of mutual trust
between the software author and the verification engineer is presumed: First, the verifica-
tion engineer believes that the sources provided by the software author have been indeed
used to produce the final binary, and second, the software author expects the verification
engineer to respect its IP rights on the provided sources.
But in an industrial context, violated IP rights and forged verification verdicts entail
enormous monetary damages and henceforth a mutual trust relationship is insufficient as
protection against such misconduct. We identified two security properties which are essen-
tial for any security solution facilitating verification across IP boundaries: First, confor-
mance requires that the verification verdict and the delivered binary are produced from the
same source, and second, secrecy requires that the customer does not learn anything about
the sources which is not already directly encoded within the binary and the verdict.
Taking this situation as starting point, we introduced the amanat protocol as a solution
which satisfies both, conformance as well as secrecy.
Subsequently, we proved the secrecy of the protocol in an intuitive and cryptographically
unconditional manner. This is important as to provide a simple argument which asserts
the well-protection of the involved IP in a manner which is convincing to engineering and
management staff of a code supplying company. In case of conformance, the proof required
a much more technical approach since abstract reasoning on the protocol (e.g., following
the Dolev-Yao style) is insufficient to establish conformance.
We also envision wider applications of our protocol: First, we consider deep supply
chains in the B2B setting where the final code consumer wants to ensure conformance
while facing a possibly maliciously colluding group of chained suppliers. Second, we con-
sider a B2C setting, i.e., for commercial-off-the-shelf software. In this case, the customer
party of the amanat protocol will not be enacted by an end customer, but by a certification
agency which provides commercial verification services. A detailed exploration of these
scenarios will be part of future work.
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